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Abstract: This article question the under-
lying assumptions and, therefore, potential 
effectiveness of Anthony Alfieri’s recent es-
say, “Defending Racial Violence. Alfieri’s 
proposal, in the form of an enforceable rule, 
would likely wind up on a collision course 
with principles underlying the First Amen-
dment to the U.S. Constitution. The article 
demonstrates the level of confusion that 
develops from rules that too easily or arbi-
trarily frustrate the legitimate interests of at-
torneys and clients in pursuing the best cri-
minal defense. It also recommends providing 
carefully constructed, simulated exercises 
for classroom dialogue in ethics courses as a 
viable, alternative method for introducing a 
race - conscious ethic to young lawyers that 
does not run afoul of basic constitutional 
freedoms. The article disagrees with Alfieri’s 
conclusion that “defense lawyers find scarce 
opportunity to contest the dominant narra-
tives embedded in laws, institutional practi-
ces, and legal relations, even when those nar-
ratives inscribe negative racial stereotypes.” 
The article concludes that the history and 
evolution of the entire system of criminal 
justice in this country dictates greater relian-
ce upon mainstream prescriptions of neu-
trality rather than race-conscious rules and 
affirm that on questions concerning injury 
to black America’s social identity, critics like 
Alfieri usually fail to consider just how broad 
the range of race-based assumptions are that 
ground representations of moral agency.
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Resumo: Este artigo questiona os pressu-
postos subjacentes e a potencial efetividade 
do recente ensaio de Anthony Alfieri, inti-
tulado “Defendendo a violência racial”. A 
proposta de Alfieri, na forma de uma regra 
aplicável, colide com os princípios da Primei-
ra Emenda à Constituição dos EUA. O arti-
go demonstra a confusão gerada a partir de 
regras que fácil ou arbitrariamente frustram 
os legítimos interesses de procuradores e de 
clientes em busca da melhor defesa criminal. 
O artigo também recomenda métodos alter-
nativos para a discussão racial nas Universi-
dades e discorda que os advogados de defesa 
têm escassa oportunidade para contestar as 
narrativas dominantes embutidas em leis, 
em práticas institucionais, mesmo quando 
essas narrativas inscrevem estereótipos ra-
ciais negativos. O artigo conclui que a histó-
ria e a evolução de todo o sistema de justiça 
criminal dos EUA exige maior dependência 
de prescrições tradicionais de neutralidade 
do que normas de consciência racial e sus-
tenta que, em questões relativas à agresão 
racial aos negros da América, críticas como a 
de Alfieri geralmente falham em considerar o 
quanto os preconceitos raciais são represen-
tações que sustentam modelos morais.
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1 Introduction
 
 Anthony Alfieri’s recent essay, “Defending Racial Violence,”1 analyzes va-
rious models of legal argumentation and strategy.2 The essay focuses on the trial of 
two black men charged with attacking a white trucker during the Los Angeles upri-
sing sparked by the acquittal of four white police officers who brutalized Rodney 
King.3 After examining what he calls the rhetorical structure of defense arguments 
in the case, Alfieri reaches some interesting conclusions, which he would apparen-
tly generalize to all cases of black-on-white violence. Alfieri asserts that race-based 
narratives of deviance – stories of ghettoized deprivation, neglect, and resulting 
pathologies – are used by criminal defense attorneys to hone arguments that mar 
their individual clients’ legal identities and distort the integrity of the entire black 
community.4 According to his analysis, when defense attorneys present narratives 
of “black deviance” they depict the collective black community as virtually in-
capable of exercising morally responsible choices.5 Alfieri, though, seems far less 
concerned with group libel than with what he characterizes as depersonalization 
of “individual responsibility for violent behavior.”6 The essay, which does not offer 
any version of a tentative Model Rule of Professional Responsibility, proposes as 
a matter of ethical responsibility that lawyers be constrained in one of two ways. 
Alfieri argues that lawyers should either be precluded from utilizing narratives of 
“black deviance,” or be held “responsible” for the absence of lawyer-client consul-
tations concerning defense strategies and perceptions related to individual moral 
character and community integrity.7 [*789] 
 Besides the inherent difficulty of reaching a consensus on all the dynamics 
that affect high-profile cases, which – In the United States – Include interra-
cial crimes of violence, Alfieri’s proposal to ban “black deviance” narratives is 
unworkable for many different reasons. First and foremost, the proposal remains 
disconnected from any concrete goal or objective that a rulemaking body could 
effectively monitor or control, assuming it possessed the requisite authority. Se-
cond, the case study method is ineffective for advancing Alfieri’s claim.8 If his 
argument is that black men who commit violent crimes against innocent whites 
are “getting away with it” or that defense lawyers in such cases routinely argue 
that these defendants are mostly blameless (under a “black deviance” theory), he 
has failed to make his case. If, instead, he simply believes that it is morally wrong 
for attorneys to intentionally and recklessly depict black America as “lacking in 
the properties of mind and character necessary for moral agency”9 under any 
circumstances, then he should seriously examine the conduct of a representative 
sample of criminal defense attorneys to determine if such a problem actually 
exists. Instead, Alfieri merely points to a series of neutral arguments orchestrated 
by defense attorneys in a single case - arguments which he urges his readers to 
construe as suggesting race-based deviance. Relying heavily upon his knowledge 
of the defendants’ and victim’s races, Alfieri never substantiates his claim that 
the lawyers’ presentation of the “group contagion” diminished capacity defense 
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uniquely implicates only black community character and behavior, in Los An-
geles or elsewhere. Yet, Alfieri justifies his proposal by arguing that use of the 
“mob-violence incited” defense in this trial suggests that “young black males as 
a group, and the black community as a whole, share a pathological tendency to 
commit acts of violence.”10 The principal flaw of Alfieri’s essay is that in all but 
one passage he presents as a form of “race-talk,” defense lawyers easily could have 
been describing a white community, and two white defendants who grew up in a 
predominantly white environment. Prior to issuing a blanket prohibition, Alfieri 
should have determined whether legal narratives of “black deviance” are a signi-
ficant source of harm to the social identities or integrity of African Americans.
 In Part I, I question the underlying assumptions and, therefore, potential 
effectiveness of Alfieri’s proposal. Contrary to Alfieri’s conclusion, defense stories 
of “black deviance” in cases involving black defendants tend to reflect, and perhaps 
reinforce perceptions of black and white social identities, rather than construct new 
ones. To constrain the options  [*790]  of criminal defense attorneys would pres-
cribe a uniquely legal remedy for what is essentially a socially constructed problem. 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a significant number of lawyers de-
fending blacks indicted for black-on-white crimes intentionally and recklessly use 
narratives of “black deviance” for the sole purpose of winning acquittals for their 
clients, Alfieri’s proposal, in the form of an enforceable rule, would likely wind up 
on a collision course with principles underlying the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. Beyond Alfieri’s failure to discuss an appropriate sanction for lawyers 
who violate the rule, it is not entirely clear from his essay when a violation would 
occur. Thus, challenges to his proposal would rely on First Amendment principles 
governing vagueness11 and overbreadth.12 More significantly, the restraints proposed 
under Alfieri’s “ethic of race-conscious responsibility” represent a form of content-
-based regulation that the Constitution forbids.13
 Part II, relying on an analysis of law student discussion in ethics class, 
demonstrates the level of confusion that develops from rules that too easily or 
arbitrarily frustrate the legitimate interests of attorneys and clients in pursuing 
the best criminal defense. Part III recommends providing carefully constructed, 
simulated exercises for classroom dialogue in ethics courses as a viable, alternative 
method for introducing a race – conscious ethic to young lawyers that does not 
run afoul of basic constitutional freedoms. In defending or prosecuting highly 
charged racial cases, attorneys may want to consider the promise of deliberative 
empathy.14 This technique presents the single strongest argument against Alfieri’s 
proposal to ban from the courtroom speech that presents specified points of view. 
Lawyers challenging what they perceive to be illegitimate uses of racialized nar-
ratives will make the best use of their training and talent, following the tradition 
of the “more speech” paradigm. I disagree with Alfieri’s conclusion that “defense 
lawyers find scarce opportunity to contest the dominant narratives embedded in 
laws, institutional practices, and legal relations, even when those narratives inscri-
be negative racial stereotypes.”15 Criminal justice is sought through an adversarial 
system in which lawyers through their role as advocates, and with their training in 
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the art of legal argumentation, are equipped to overcome the difficulties  [*791] 
presented by racialized narratives irrespective of whether such narratives origina-
te with opposing counsel or filter into the courtroom from other environments.16
 This response concludes that on questions concerning injury to black 
America’s social identity, critics like Alfieri usually fail to consider just how broad 
the range of race-based assumptions are that ground representations of moral 
agency. The history and evolution of the entire system of criminal justice in this 
country dictates greater reliance upon mainstream prescriptions of neutrality ra-
ther than race-conscious rules.
2 The legal v. Social experience of racial subordination for african 
americans
 
 One could legitimately ask why Alfieri focused so heavily on a case that 
lends little credibility to his thesis and neglected other opportunities to inves-
tigate how other race-based narratives shape black identity. Fundamentally, the 
“race-talk” that Alfieri may uncover in legal argumentation is tightly bound to 
and originates from an ongoing social discourse that dehumanizes blacks and 
other racial minorities in relation to whites. The dialogue may filter into the cour-
troom, but the buzzwords, sound bites, and color-coded descriptions proliferate 
during media coverage of highly charged racial cases. Alfieri describes narratives 
of black “deviance and defiance” but does not consider, in his exploration of the 
“rhetoric of race [...] in criminal defense advocacy and ethics dealing with racially 
motivated private violence,”17 the manner in which narratives of “white defiance” 
operate to exculpate whites guilty of violent crimes against African Americans.
 White defiance narratives - depicting morally responsible, courageous in-
dividuals who are forced to rebel against or respond to an injustice - lower per-
ceptions of a valued black population and threaten the integrity of the white 
community.18 They effectively alter the substantive outcomes of some criminal 
cases along with certain social realities.19  The police and community reactions 
during the racial hoax cases involving Charles Stuart and Susan Smith, the public 
and media defense of Bernard Goetz, the implications of the state trial acquittal 
of the police officers who brutalized Rodney King, and the media coverage of the 
ju-  [*792]  rors and jury profiles in the criminal trial of O.J. Simpson are recent 
examples of this disturbing phenomenon.20
 Media coverage of violent interracial crimes presumptively characterizes 
white defendants and victims using narratives of “white defiance;” at the same 
time, deviance narratives are accepted, by and large, as the rule rather than the 
exception for black victims, defendants, and now jurors. Racialized narratives are 
featured repeatedly in a media-driven public discourse that perniciously questions 
the motives, morals, and credibility of the black community while elevating the 
social standing, legitimacy, and value of whites. As was done in fighting so many 
of the race-based injustices of the past, when black America, across socioeconomic 
lines, decides that it will no longer acquiesce in the face of obdurate reproductions 
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of libelous images and skewed identities, that will mark the beginning of a per-
manent shift in this phenomenon. Until then, we must recognize that attorneys 
defending high-profile clients in racially charged cases are stuck, to some extent, 
with the social identity of the client that has already played out in the media. 
Such a recognition undermines justifications for additional controls on attorney 
behavior in an adversarial system, unless such controls relate directly to lawyer-
-media relations.21
 Alfieri’s proposal is unprecedented: It openly restricts defense lawyers to 
certain legal arguments, regardless of their value or proximity to “objective” truth. 
His proposal is divorced from any goal of advancing substantive justice. This fact 
sets his proposal apart from other restrictions upon lawyer’s speech authorized 
by the Model Rules.22 These rules do not intrude into the strategic options of 
lawyers and clients absent a clear showing of intentional wrongdoing. Delegating 
“responsibility” for advancing the race-conscious ethic that Alfieri proposes jeo-
pardizes the presentation of both legitimate and questionable deviance-related 
argu-  [*793]  ments in one fell swoop.23 Lawyers looking for adequate notice 
of exactly what the rule forbids would be placed in the untenable position of 
having to guess when its boundary was about to be crossed. Even a rule banning 
all race-based narratives is unlikely to survive constitutional challenge. Attempts 
to prescribe only racially sanitized defense stories will be met with vigorous and 
legitimate challenges by attorneys who believe that a racially dominant narrative 
is central to the just resolution of their particular case. Thus, a lawyer’s choice to 
characterize a racist police officer who has testified in a criminal case as a neo-
-Nazi would be defended on the grounds that the Constitution does not permit 
suppression of the “truth” in order to impose a racially acceptable orthodoxy. 
Alfieri’s proposal, however, seeks to silence only certain racial perspectives - tho-
se likely to be expressed while defending charges related to an interracial crime 
of violence perpetrated by black defendants. In essence, he seeks to impose a 
viewpoint-based restriction that interferes with the First Amendment and Sixth 
Amendment liberties of both the lawyer and client. The Supreme Court has sub-
jected rules restricting the speech rights of lawyers engaged in criminal defense to 
high levels of scrutiny, striking down ethics rules which impose vague and arbitra-
ry rules of conduct.24
3 In pursuit of the best criminal defense
 
In proposing that lawyers forego use of “black deviance” narratives, Alfieri 
presumes that the criminal defense lawyers’ mandate to win, coupled with their 
tendency to lump black males into a deviant category, produces a harm for which 
attorneys are not held accountable.25 However, his solution is antithetical to the 
lawyer’s duty to act solely in the interests of individual clients – a duty which in 
certain cases may require the use of racialized narratives. A lawyer who introdu-
ces expert testimony (rather than personal musings) on the history, evolution or 
significance of the use of the word nigger by law enforcement officials has effec-
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tively presented a racialized narrative. Even though the Model Rules of  [*794] 
Professional Responsibility are a race-neutral body of rules, they clearly permit 
arguments pertaining to such testimony.
 The Model Rules are founded upon race-neutral principles26 and place very 
few restrictions on the strategic and rhetorical options of trial attorneys, other 
than that evidence be honestly and truthfully presented.27 Similarly, the American 
Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice, which are highly regarded in a 
majority of states, leave most rhetorical choices to the advocate.28 Consistent with 
other model provisions, one guideline provides a broad analogue to Alfieri’s pro-
posal. The standards temper lawyers’ use of rhetoric during criminal trials under 
Standard 4-7.7 (Arguments To The Jury).29   This section, originally designed to 
insure trial fairness, simply states that “defense counsel should not make argu-
ments calculated to appeal to the prejudice of the jury.”30   
 My own experience teaching the mandatory legal ethics course indica-
tes that law students - for all of their zeal in justifying the conduct of criminal 
defense lawyers on behalf of clients - exhibit poor understanding of how this 
rule should operate. Standard 4-7.7 states a general prohibition, while Alfieri’s 
proposal addresses the “ethics” of the use of “black deviance” narratives. In light 
of classroom discussions in which students vigorously asserted the “client first” 
orthodoxy only to abandon it when confronted with an unpopular criminal defen-
dant in a racially charged case, I have little reason to be optimistic about lawyers’ 
ability to understand, or apply Alfieri’s rule with consistency. The aforementioned 
First Amendment objections aside, general confusion and arbitrary application 
provide sufficient grounds for questioning the efficacy of his rule.
 Most students heavily scrutinize rules of conduct that they perceive as in-
terfering with zealous representation. When confronted with a textbook hypothe-
tical exploring a law firm’s duty to its junior associates, and a potential conflict of 
interest in serving the needs of a client, the students were adamant in their views. 
The best interest of the client, broadly construed, should always prevail - even if 
that means allowing jurors’ prejudices to dictate litigation strategy. Although the 
standards forbid arguments that play to those prejudices, tactical decisions made 
to accommodate them at the expense of equity and fairness received little or no 
[*795]  scrutiny from a large majority of students. A synopsis of the problem and 
a summary of the ensuing discussion follows:
Karen Horowitz is a third year associate at a firm where she has 
competently handled the legal matters of a banking client for over 
two years. The client has recently been named as a defendant in a 
suit brought in a certain jurisdiction deep in the South. Horowitz, 
contrary to her legitimate expectation, has been told that she will 
not be a part of the litigation team handling the case because ev-
eryone in this jurisdiction belongs to one sort of white supremacist 
group or another. A Jewish female lawyer, among others, would 
not be favorably received, and has no hope of winning the case.31
 
Interracial violence and racialized narratives ...
51EJJL                                                                         Chapecó, v. 13, n. 3, p. 45-58, Edição Especial 2012
One could conclude that the potential thirty million dollar judgment un-
duly influenced the discussion that followed, but many students swore that the 
money did not influence them. Almost without exception they agreed that the 
decision to take Horowitz off the case was a strategic decision made in the client’s 
best interest. That her presence may be desired on a case where being female and 
a Jew would be seen as assets was described as merely the flip side of the same 
coin. As part of the assignment I asked the students to come up with a win-win si-
tuation. The only “win” that most were able to contemplate on their own was the 
hiring of local counsel to advance the client’s cause. Very little thought was given 
to questions such as whether the firm had a duty to state clearly its policies on 
such matters, so as to provide adequate notice to lawyers and clients; whether the 
associate, in light of the firm’s decision, deserved additional compensation (such 
as credit toward partnership); or whether there was some other behind-the-scenes 
role that Horowitz could or should have been allowed to assume given the nature 
and timing of the dilemma. A few students expressed strong views on these issues, 
concluding that the young lawyer was entitled to more than a pat on the head ac-
companied by a welcome to the “real world.” One or two declared that neither the 
firm nor the client had a legitimate interest in removing her from the case. For the 
most part, the dissenters were denounced for their willingness to subordinate the 
best interests of the client “because the case involved money.” They were accused 
of basing their judgment upon an irrational, and perhaps subconscious, indiffe-
rence toward economic or business interests. One critic went so far as to conclude 
that the group would never even entertain such views had the discussion centered 
on the interests of a client facing prison or capital punishment. The vocal majority 
had in fact shown a marked proclivity toward allowing questionable conduct on 
the part of attorneys engaged in criminal defense.
 In subsequent weeks we discussed attorney conduct in the trial of O.J. 
Simpson. Many students expressed the view that defense attorney Johnnie Co-
chran had violated Standard 4-7.7 by making arguments  [*796]  designed to 
appeal to jurors’ prejudices.32   Cochran’s depiction of police detective Mark Fuhr-
man as a Nazi was widely denounced, even though it was based upon concrete 
evidence that this key prosecution witness bragged about brutalizing and framing 
black Americans, and had possible ties to militant white supremacist organiza-
tions.33 Few students raised serious objections to the judge’s ruling that excluded 
Fuhrman’s taped confessions concerning the planting of evidence, and only two 
challenged as legally significant the fact that the judge rather than the jury would 
decide if Fuhrman’s confessions were simply hyperbole. None questioned the pro-
priety of a higher court stepping in to alter jury instructions regarding Fuhrman’s 
late decision to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
However, when Cochran told jurors to strike a blow for justice by sending, throu-
gh an acquittal, a message to government officials about police corruption, he 
was viewed as having crossed a bright line. Most students thought him guilty 
of playing to a race-based prejudice that compromised the outcome of the trial. 
Although prosecutor Marcia Clark also admonished jurors to strike a blow for 
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justice by sending a message to wife-batterers everywhere through conviction of 
Simpson, she received no criticism whatsoever. None of the students questioned 
ethical boundaries in relation to her behavior.
4 The best use of lawyers’ training and talent
 
 The theory that the best response to speech that threatens the exercise of 
other fundamental rights is simply more speech on the same subject has garnered 
more than its fair share of criticism for legitimate reasons. Young lawyers may find 
themselves in a courtroom, responding to a racialized narrative that they believe 
compromises the just outcome of a particular case. In these instances the more 
speech paradign provides the best defense. Lawyers should be not only forewarned 
but also trained, during the course of their legal education, to face such crises head 
on. Exercises that effectively demonstrate how defense lawyers use what Alfieri 
identifies as imaginative empathy may be a starting point. Such exercises could be 
incorporated into mandatory legal ethics classes and trial practice courses.
 “Imaginative empathy honors difference by “allowing the empathizer to 
construct the other as a completely separate being ...’ “34 It thus enables us to own 
up to our racial legacy without sacrificing justice. This race-conscious solution was 
utilized by attorney/author John  [*797]  Grisham in his book A Time to Kill.35 
The fictional account of a double murder case features an enraged black father who 
purposefully shot and killed two racists who raped his ten-year-old daughter. After a 
high-profile indictment and trial in what quickly became a racially charged case, the 
jury and the public seemed hopelessly divided. In seeking to break the jury deadlo-
ck, one white female juror convinced other jurors, who were also white, to join her 
in the following exercise. “Pretend with me for a moment. I want you to use your 
imaginations. I want you to close your eyes and listen to nothing but my voice.”36
Pretend that the little girl had blond hair and blue eyes, that the two rapists 
were black, that they tied her ... [and] raped her ... Picture the little girl layin’ 
there beggin’ for her daddy while they kicked her in the mouth and ... broke both 
jaws... [She told the jurors to ... I]magine that the little girl belonged to them - 
their daughter. Be honest with themselves and to write on a piece of paper whe-
ther or not they would kill those black bastards if they got the chance.37
The vote was twelve to zero in favor of acquittal.
Bernard Goetz, who in the late 1980s may have been the most widely 
discussed white criminal defendant, shot four black teenagers, at least two in the 
back, without provocation, and was acquitted of all charges related to the shoo-
ting.38 The case provides one of the clearest examples of how narratives of “white 
defiance” when coupled with narratives of “black deviance” can alter substantive 
outcomes in certain criminal cases, as well as black social reality.39 According to 
Stephen Carter, the great “tragedy of the Goetz case is that a public barely aware 
of the facts was rooting for him to get away with it.”40 Narratives of “white defian-
ce” are most destructive when they are used to exculpate the unknown white who 
admits or is proven guilty of committing violent crimes against black Americans.
Interracial violence and racialized narratives ...
53EJJL                                                                         Chapecó, v. 13, n. 3, p. 45-58, Edição Especial 2012
 Narratives of “black deviance” were used to justify public reaction to 
Goetz’s crimes.41 Patricia Williams notes “the degree to which the public  [*798] 
devoured, ex post facto, stories about the deviant behavior of the victims in this 
case. The victims’ criminal propensities - allegations ranging from rape to robbery 
- were used ... to show why the four young men deserved to be the objects of 
intent to kill.”42 While the victims were characterized as social deviants - violent 
and dangerous street punks - Goetz’s defiance of the law, which jurors rewar-
ded with an acquittal and requests for his autograph, was deemed an act of he-
roism.43 Williams concluded her analysis of the case by introducing the following 
story, which, “with minor character alterations, is excerpted from Goetz’s video-
taped confession.”44 It could have made for the kind of closing argument that the 
Grisham tale suggests.
A lone black man was riding in an elevator in a busy downtown department 
store. The elevator stopped on the third floor, and a crowd of noisy white high 
school students got on. The black man took out a gun, shot as many of them as 
he could, before the doors opened on the first floor and the rest fled for their lives. 
The black man later explained to the police that he could tell from the “body lan-
guage” of the students, from their “shiny eyes and big smiles,” that they wanted 
to “play with him, like a cat plays with a mouse.” Furthermore, the black man 
explained, one of the youths had tried to panhandle money from him and another 
asked him “how are you?”
 “That’s a meaningless thing,” he said in his confession, but “in certain circu-
mstances, that can be a real threat.” He added that a similar greeting had preceded 
the vicious beating of his father, a black civil rights lawyer in Mississippi, some time 
before. His intention, he confessed, was to murder the high school students.45
Williams concludes that “most white Americans would not hesitate to pro-
nounce the severe contextual misapprehensions of the black gunman as a form 
of insanity.”46 With varying degrees of sympathy, he would be judged in need of 
institutionalization because of the danger presented to himself and others.47
 The differences in the actual, versus the potential, outcome of the Goetz 
case reveal how stories of white defiance (in particular) served to cloud public 
judgment in relation to the substance and process of criminal justice in that case. 
That Goetz’s lawyers may have taken advantage of the fog is but one reality of an 
adversarial system for which there are likely to be few practical remedies beyond 
well-trained opposing counsel. The underlying assumption that such behavior 
corresponds with a lawyer’s duty to render effective representation to a client 
facing criminal  [*799]  prosecution cannot be challenged on the grounds that it 
encourages the social prejudices of the general community.
5 Conclusion
 
 The theme of Alfieri’s assertions is that it may be not only useful but also 
imperative to encourage community-based deliberations on the morality of the 
use of racialized narratives. I agree. For example, I believe it imperative to ackno-
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wledge the role of the media in exploiting narratives of “black deviance” and “whi-
te defiance” during trials involving interracial crimes of violence. Likewise, there 
are instances when a pivotal institution must reevaluate how its use of race-based 
narratives reflects upon its asserted commitment to diversity. This occurred when 
a group of black parents were successful in convincing their local school board to 
remove Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn from the Middle School curriculum in 
New Haven, Connecticut. Nevertheless, few would agree that such deliberations 
need to begin with the heart of criminal defense. The debate over the criminal 
justice system is so skewed that there is scarcely room for a mixed-race discussion 
of the racially disparate substantive and procedural outcomes generated by the 
system as it operates in the United States today. Unless reform measures are im-
plemented to reduce many of these disparities, there is little hope for forming the 
sense of community upon which to base the broader discussion.
 In light of the complex history of race relations in the United States, cons-
training the options of criminal defense attorneys could never be legitimately 
viewed as a necessary first step toward achieving the result that Alfieri seeks. It 
seems unlikely that commissioners representing the American Bar Association 
would ever seriously consider acting upon Alfieri’s proposed rule because, in addi-
tion to being violative of constitutional norms, it seeks a legal remedy for a so-
cially constructed problem.
 Legal ethics courses may be the best forum for discussing cases where ra-
cialized narratives and interracial violence intersect, and for encouraging young 
attorneys to take the higher road. That setting might encourage acknowledgment 
of the differences in our attitudes during highly charged racial cases as historical 
reflections of our perceptions, denial, and distrust. A community ethic could de-
velop out of deeper understanding and discussion of the nation’s racial legacy; 
without such an ethic there is little opportunity for a comprehensive examination 
of problems related to justice, racial violence, and the use of racialized narratives.
Footnotes
1 Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301 (1995).
2 See id. at 131016.
3 According to one source, the uprising was sparked when a group of police officers 
tried to arrest a teenage boy shortly after the verdict was announced. One witness 
stated that “three of them had him on the ground.” CNN News: The Rage of Des-
pair (CNN News television broadcast, May 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, Script File) (statement of eighth riot victim).
4 See Alfieri, supra note 1, at 131213 (claiming those who adopt deviance the-
ory have a tendency toward pathologizing racial difference by combining mental 
disorder or incompetence with claims of cultural or environmental deprivation).
5 See id. at 1314.
6 Id.
7 See id. at 134142.
Interracial violence and racialized narratives ...
55EJJL                                                                         Chapecó, v. 13, n. 3, p. 45-58, Edição Especial 2012
8 Although analyzing the strategy employed in a single trial would not qualify 
as an empirically valid survey of defense attorney conduct, data gathered from 
individual case studies can, in some instances, inform the rulemaking process and 
supply important sources of information for examining whether race-conscious 
theories are valuable in certain areas of law.
9 Alfieri, supra note 1, at 1304.
10 Id. at 1311.
11 Vague laws may deter persons from engaging in constitutionally protected spe-
ech. All government regulations must be drawn with narrow specificity to insure 
that they will not be susceptible to sweeping and improper application. See, e.g., 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
12 Challenges to a statute or regulation as overbroad rest primarily upon a claim 
that the language is so sweeping that it includes both protected and unprotected 
speech within its scope, in violation of the Constitution. See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. 
v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
13 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (First Amendment 
generally prohibits regulations of speech and restrictions based on content are 
presumptively invalid).
14 See Alfieri, supra note 1, at 1328.
15 Id. at 1305.
16 Alfieri argues that defense lawyers must take a short-term view of the problem 
within the context of a specific case. See id.
17 See id. at 130304.
18 Stories of “white defiance” injure the larger community when they produce 
racial discrepancies that are widely ignored while claims of principled impartiality 
are used to repudiate the fact that race-based disparities, more than “black sensi-
tivity,” undermine the ethical foundation of race-related dialogue.
19 See infra notes 3746 and accompanying text.
20 See Fox Butterfield, Charles Stuart’s Brother Indicted in Murder Case, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 27, 1991, at A12 (police initially believed Stuart’s account that he 
and his eight-month pregnant wife were assaulted by a black gunman, but when 
Stuart became a suspect, he committed suicide); Rick Bragg, Susan Smith Verdict 
Brings Relief to Town, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1995, 1, at 16 (Smith convicted for 
murder of her two children after she had “lied for nine days with tales of a black 
carjacker”); Carlyle C. Douglas & Mary Connelly, The Goetz Case’s Jury Sees Jus-
tification, Some See Injustice, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1987, 4, at 6 (white gunman 
acquitted in shooting of four black youths on subway, convicted only on weapons 
charge); Laura Mansnerus, Under Fire, Jury System Faces Overhaul, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 4, 1995, 1, at 9 (commenting on jury behavior in Rodney King police bea-
ting and O.J. Simpson murder acquittals).
21 For example, a lawyer discovered feeding to news reporters information known 
to be inadmissible as an evidentiary matter has violated clear norms for which 
sanctions should apply. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6 (1994).
22 Rules governing the ability of judges and lawyers directly involved in pending 
matters to comment upon cases, for example, relate to trial fairness, and are fur-
ther justified by efforts to maintain public confidence in the administration of jus-
tice. See id. cmt. 1; see also Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(6) (1989) 
(regarding judicial speech).
Robin D. Barnes
56 EJJL                                                                         Chapecó, v. 13, n. 3, p. 45-58, Edição Especial 2012
23 The Supreme Court’s Neutral Principles approach to First Amendment issues, 
see e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), could easily lead to 
Alfieri’s arguments taking effect in ways he did not imagine. Consider the follo-
wing analogue: Professor A examines a single trial where defense lawyers presen-
ted forced incest as a mitigating circumstance, and where the prosecuting attorney 
told the jurors (during closing argument) that white men have taken a beating 
in the politically correct police-state now occupying legal discourse. Professor A 
concludes that gender-talk is being used to exculpate women and diminish the 
normative prescription of individual responsibility for criminal conduct. Therefo-
re, he argues that defense strategies which suggest that a woman is blameless for 
crimes committed against men - in a male-dominated society which fails to deal 
seriously with domestic abuse or sexual assault against women - is morally sus-
pect. Professor A believes that such arguments should be banned in the courtroom 
because gender-based narratives of deviance compromise perceptions of moral 
agency, and the integrity of all women.
24 See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-49 (1991).
25 See Alfieri, supra note 1, at 1321.
26 Under Neutral Principles, the professional ethics rules, see, e.g., Standards for 
Criminal Justice 4-7.7, and the rules of evidence Fed. R. Evid. 403, forbid state-
ments that are legally irrelevant but highly prejudicial, and statements that are 
patently false. In this regard, the evidentiary rules concerning false statements 
refer to all false statements, not merely false statements which express a certain 
view concerning race, sex, or sexual orientation, for example.
27 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 (1994).
28 See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, in Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, 
Jr., Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes & Standards 550 (1995).
29 See id. Standard 4-7.7.
30 Id.
31 See Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics 21718 
(4th ed. 1995).
32 See supra notes 2829 and accompanying text.
33 Tim Rutten & Andrea Ford, Families’ Anger Erupts Outside the Courtroom, 
L.A. Times, Sept. 29, 1995, at A1 (families of victims in Simpson trial express 
anger at Cochran’s comparison of Fuhrman to Nazi).
34 Alfieri, supra note 1, at 1328 (quoting Cynthia V. Ward, A Kinder Gentler Li-
beralism? Visions of Empathy in Feminist and Communitarian Literature, 61 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 929, 931 (1994)).
35 See John Grisham, A Time To Kill (1989).
36 Id. at 477.
37 Id. at 485.
38 See David E. Pitt, Goetz is Cleared in Subway Attack, N.Y. Times, June 17, 
1987, at A1.
39 See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 Yale L.J. 
420, 428 (1988). The author contends that the underlying message or perception 
for blacks living in New York is that they can “no longer be certain which gesture 
of impatience or annoyance someone else will take as a threat, [thus they may be] 
loathe to ask directions or change of a dollar for fear of a fatal misinterpretation.” 
Id. at 426.
Interracial violence and racialized narratives ...
57EJJL                                                                         Chapecó, v. 13, n. 3, p. 45-58, Edição Especial 2012
40 Id. at 424. A significant question remains as to how Goetz ever escaped the 
lesser charge of reckless endangerment when there was no dispute about the fact 
that he took out a loaded gun and opened fire in a New York City subway.
41 According to one scholar, this appears to be a growing trend. See Jody D. Ar-
mour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Invo-
luntary Negrophobes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 781, 783 (1994) (identifying three kinds 
of racist fears that have been used in self-defense claims by defendants).
42 Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 77 (1991).
43 See id. at 78.
44 Id. at 77.
45 Id. at 76.
46 Id.
47 See id. at 7677. 
 
Data da submissão: 20 de julho de 2012
Avaliado em: 4 de setembro de 2012 (Avaliador A)
Avaliado em: 29 de outubro de 2012 (Avaliador B)
Aceito em: 29 de outubro de 2012

